Canada, the G8 and the G20: A Canadian Approach to Shaping Global Governance in a Shifting International Environment by Smith, Gordon S. & Heap, Peter C.
www.pol icyschool.ca
SPP Research Papers
Volume 3•Issue 8• November 2010
CANADA, THE G8, AND THE G20:
A Canadian Approach to Shaping
Global Governance in a Shifting
International Environment
Gordon S. Smith and Peter C. Heap
ABSTRACT
This paper reviews the history of the Group of Eight (G8) and the
subsequent establishment of the Group of Twenty (G20).  It summarizes
and analyzes the outcome of the most recent G8 and G20 Summits held in
2010 at Huntsville and Toronto respectively.  It takes stock of the G8/G20
summit processes, noting the emerging trends with respect to the role of
Government Leaders, summit management and summit effectiveness. The
paper concludes with a series of recommendations for a Canadian
approach to influencing the rapid changes in international decision-making
manifested by recent G8 and G20 experience. Chief among these
suggestions is that Canada should lead work on resolving the relationship
between the G8 and the G20 with a view to consolidating the G20 as a fully
functioning instrument of global governance.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
In the 1990s, the noted international political theorist James Rosenau discussed global
governance in a way that captured the breadth of a concept which continues to evolve today. In
a 1995 article, he observed:
Global governance refers to more than the formal institutions and
organizations through which the management of international affairs is
or is not sustained … It is conceived to include systems of rule at all
levels of human activity – from the family to the international
organization – in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of
control has transnational repercussions.1
The usefulness of this approach lies in its recognition that, at this stage (and probably for the
foreseeable future), no single institution or organization has responsibility for managing issues
that affect people and their governments everywhere. World government is no more likely now
than it has ever been, notwithstanding the impact of a globalized economy and the growing
threats to the global environment, notably the effects of climate change.2
On a number of occasions over the past 200 years, however, government leaders have sought
to work together to address challenges that were both broadly significant and difficult to
resolve through unilateral action. The track record of these joint efforts is mixed. After initial
displays of enthusiasm, the tendency has been for new ways of doing business and for their
attendant institutions to decline, often leaving little in the way of legacy.
The usual trigger for cooperation at the supra-regional scale has been disaster. The devastating
Napoleonic Wars ended in 1814 and 1815 with the Congress of Vienna, at which the victorious
powers established the Concert of Europe, arguably “the first peacetime multilateral crisis
management forum.”3 Scholarly judgment about the efficacy of the Concert in promoting
peace in Europe is divided, but by mid-century Great Power solidarity was clearly breaking
down — as illustrated by the Crimean War of 1854-56 and the Franco-Prussian War of
1870-71, to name two major examples.4 
1 James N. Rosenau, “Governance in the Twenty-first Century,” Global Governance 1 (1, 1995): 13-14.
2 Indeed, Rosenau suggests that the phenomenon of globalization brings with it simultaneous pressures toward both
integration and fragmentation, a paradox he encapsulates in the term “fragmegration” (ibid.).
3 Dan Lindley, “Avoiding Tragedy in Power Politics: The Concept of Europe, Transparency, and Crisis Management,”
Security Studies 13 (2, 2003/2004): 195.
4 Lindley emphasizes the benefits attached to increased transparency encouraged by the Concert system (as opposed to
any normative transformation the Concert might have brought about). More generally, he concludes, “When
communications are increased, incidents can sometimes be resolved with greater ease. There will still be hard
bargaining during crises, but increased transparency clarifies bargaining positions, stakes, and relative power, and this
can reduce miscalculation, and spur agreement, successful coercion, or acceptance of deadlock. Simply put, forums
facilitate power politics.” (Ibid., 229.)
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The European balance of power supposedly enshrined in the Concert shattered definitively in
the bloody cauldron of World War I, and in its aftermath came the next effort to manage issues
across national boundaries: Paris 1919. The year-long peace conference in Paris eventually
generated five treaties that imposed terms on the defeated states, presided over the break-up of
the Austro-Hungarian, German, and Ottoman Empires, and established a new international
forum, the League of Nations.5 In the end, the Paris Conference, with its collection of vivid
personalities, simply provided a breathing space before the next episode in Great Power rivalry
triggered World War II, a scant eighteen years later.
Politically, planning for the postwar world began as early as August 1941, when Prime
Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt met off Newfoundland on the British battleship
Prince of Wales and the US heavy cruiser Augusta. Even at this stage in the war, before the
outcome was certain and before Pearl Harbor brought in Japan as an enemy, the concern of the
two leaders was the shape of things to come. The eight principles embodied in the Atlantic
Charter laid the foundation both for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the
United Nations (UN), organizations which reflected two different, but related, mechanisms of
collective security. In the event, the UN, as the successor to the League of Nations, came into
existence on 24 October 1945, following the San Francisco Conference in April that year.
NATO followed on 4 April 1949 as a military alliance to counter the Soviet thrust into eastern
and central Europe. 
On the economic side, the main effort was aimed at preventing a recurrence of the lost years of
the Great Depression, with its self-defeating protectionism and collapse of international
liquidity. Building on the intellectual leadership of John Maynard Keynes, the Allies began to
put into place a framework of new international institutions. Launched at the Bretton Woods
conference in July 1944, this collection of bodies included the International Monetary Fund,
the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.  
Although both World Wars were followed by a spate of international institution-building, the
aftermath of the Second was distinguished by the refusal of the Americans to step aside as they
had earlier. After World War II, the United States remained dominant and engaged, rebuilding
Europe and Japan in the face of Soviet and Chinese ambitions, and extending its nuclear
umbrella on a global scale. The decades-long Cold War ensued, locking the national flag-
bearers of capitalism and communism into a pattern of conflict across several continents until
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.6
Developments since the financial crisis of 2007-2008 suggest the arrival of a major inflection
point similar to those symbolized by events in Westphalia, Vienna, Paris, San Francisco, and
Berlin. It remains to be seen whether the establishment of the G20 summit represents
incremental change or a step-function improvement in the ability of states to work together
effectively to maintain peace, stability, and prosperity.7
5 See the now-standard account of the conference in Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the
World (New York: Random House, 2002). 
6 For a compelling and comprehensive account of the European experience in this period, see Tony Judt, Postwar: A
History of Europe since 1945 (New York: Penguin Press).
7 Note the sensible warnings about asserting too much parallelism between the events of 1944 (Bretton Woods) and
2007-2008 (an alleged second Bretton Woods moment) in Eric Helleiner, “A Bretton Woods Moment? The 2007-08
Crisis and the Future of Global Finance,” International Affairs 86 (3, 2010): 619-636.
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THE RISE OF GLOBALIZATION 
The most recent attempts to devise more effective mechanisms of global governance have
occurred in the context of a major increase in globalism and its companion phenomenon,
globalization. For the purposes of this discussion, we have adopted the definitions suggested by
Keohane and Nye:
Globalism is a state of the world involving networks of
interdependence at multi-continental distances. These networks can be
linked through flows and influences of capital and goods, information
and ideas, people and force, as well as environmentally and
biologically relevant substances (such as acid rain or pathogens).
Globalization and deglobalization refer to the increase or decline of
globalism.8
Keohane and Nye point out that globalism and globalization are multidimensional in nature,
operating across economic, military, environmental, social, and cultural networks. They observe
that, at any given time in history, the intensity of the linkages in a particular dimension of
globalism varies in “thickness,” and that globalization can be characterized as the process
whereby globalism “becomes increasingly thick” — that is, the density of networks of
interdependence increases.9 A corollary of this appreciation of the effects of globalization is the
recognition that these interconnections likely will be complex and difficult to predict. Thus, an
era of rapid globalization such as the current one brings with it a significant degree of uncertainty.
Not surprisingly, the people directly affected, even when impacts of globalization bring benefits
to many in their society, often feel disoriented by the rapid pace of change and alienated from
political systems that seem incapable of managing or explaining change satisfactorily. 
The positive effects of the current round of globalization are undeniable. In the case of China
alone, the fuller integration of that economy into the international trading and investment
system has lifted hundreds of million of people out of abject poverty in an unprecedented short
time.10 Similarly, the movement of many Western corporate “back office” functions to South
Asia has hastened the growth of the Indian middle class. The darker side of economic
globalization, however, emerges in the distribution of this upsurge in wealth, both within and
among countries. This ongoing divergence in opportunity and result is placing democratic
structures under mounting pressure, just when liberal market democracy seemed to be the clear
“winner” in the philosophy-of-governance sweepstakes.11 As recently noted by Chrystia 
8 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 3rd ed. (New York: Longman, 2000), p. 2; see,
generally, their useful Introduction to their collection of essays, pp. 1-41.
9 The Silk Road is an example of a thin globalization; contemporary financial markets are an example of thick
globalization.
10 Overall in Asia, the number of people living on less than $1 a day dropped by nearly a quarter of a billion from 1990
to 2001; United Nations, The Millennium Development Goals Report, 2005 (New York: United Nations, Department
of Public Information, 2005), p. 6.
11 See, in particular, the triumphalist “end of history” thesis suggested by Francis Fukuyama, which triggered years of
debate in public policy circles: “The End of History?” The National Interest 16 (Summer 1989): 3-18.
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Freeland, the US managing editor of the Financial Times (hardly an organ of the radical left),
“the internal logic of global capitalism is making us richer overall, but also more unequal; the
internal logic of technology-enabled democracy is already being strained by the growing gap
between the very rich and everyone else.”12
Further, although the globalization of the economy may be clear, the rights and responsibilities
that might be attached to a potential globalized citizenship are much less so. If the classical
challenge to building a “just society” within liberal democracies has been the equitable
distribution of goods and services among a national population with diverse aspirations,
opportunities, and capacities, the analogous goal of crafting global distributive justice may simply
be unreachable. As the philosopher Mark Kingwell points out, the political willingness to accept
significant resource transfers from developed to developing countries does not exist. Perhaps
most important, he notes that at the heart of successful liberal democracy lies a combination of a
constant, rules-based negotiation of differences between competing groups informed by a sense
of shared enterprise: “a commitment to ends that do not reduce to transactions.”13
For the moment, that sense of shared enterprise does not exist internationally. Although some
observers have argued for the growth of a novel degree of cosmopolitanism that ultimately might
erode the basis for traditional popular support of the nation-state, that trend seems uncertain even
in Europe, where the advent of the European Union might have been expected to herald the
decline of standard nationalism in favour of regional supra-national institutions.14 A sobering
thought in this regard concerns the extremely cosmopolitan European aristocracy at the turn of
the twentieth century. Despite the many social and intellectual linkages that bound together the
rulers of Europe in an earlier time of triumphant globalization, those bonds rapidly evaporated in
the welter of two World Wars.  And even the recent, much less disastrous, economic downturn
seems to have sent many Europeans scurrying back to the safety of the homeland. For the
moment the euro remains intact, but nationalism lives on, albeit in post-modern dress.
Indeed, reports of the breakdown of the Westphalian world are probably premature.15 The nation-
state undoubtedly is coming under pressure from above (as multilateral arrangements and
institutions gain ground) and from below (as non-state actors such as transnational corporations and
non-governmental organizations act to influence public policy), but the state is likely to remain the
dominant player internationally for the foreseeable future. That being said, the problems that states
now face run well past national boundaries, and external factors (for example, international rules-
making in a range of fields) play a major role in reshaping national policies. 
12 Chrystia Freeland, “Plutocrats and the Coming Order,” Global Brief, 19 February 2010; available online at
http://globalbrief.ca/blog/2010/02/19/plutocrats-and-the-coming-order/.
13 Mark Kingwell, “The Many Faces of 21st Century Integration,” Global Brief, 14 June 2010; available online
http://globalbrief.ca/blog/2010/06/14/the-many-faces-of-21st-century-integration/.
14 For a review of public opinion data on this subject, see Pippa Norris, “Global Governance and Cosmopolitan
Citizens,” in Governance in a Globalizing World, edited by Joseph S. Nye and John D. Donahue (Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution, 2000). Norris notes that the younger generation brought up in the postwar era is less
nationalistic than its parents, but reserves judgment on whether this trend will continue (p. 175). See also works on
cosmopolitanism and citizenship by David Held — for example, Globalization Theory: Approaches and
Controversies, edited by David Held and Anthony McGrew (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2007); and James Tully,
Public Philosophy in a New Key, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
15 The term drives from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which confirmed the sovereignty of individual European
rulers (and their ability to prescribe the religion to be practised within their domains) and effectively dismantled the
Holy Roman Empire.
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Another good example of the latter relates to the issues of global inequality mentioned earlier.
The movement of people from poorer developing countries to richer developed countries
continues to generate social tensions in receiving countries as adaptation of recent immigrants
and their children to their new surroundings proceeds unevenly, or not at all. Kingwell
observes, “Integration has emerged as the central justice challenge within nations because of
the external conditions posed by inequality between nations.”16 Since 9/11, integration has
moved from being a “simple” social issue to a much more complex security setting, especially
as regards the evolution of Islamic minorities within Western societies. And in the United
States, the ongoing immigration (legal and illegal) from Latin America in general and Mexico
in particular is reshaping American economics and politics in real time, especially as it alters
the balance of the US electoral system. The US Census Bureau expects the Hispanic population
of the United States to move from 12.5% of the total population in 2000 to 24.4% in 2050. The
regional impact in states such as California, Florida, and Texas is, of course, even higher.17
In addition to outside forces driving domestic change, states must deal with problems whose
management solutions necessarily involve international cooperation.18 The most obvious of
these is climate change, but nuclear proliferation, infectious disease, and the recent financial
meltdown qualify as well. Moreover, these issues must be addressed at a time when the old
certainties about who “counts” in international relations are being called into question. The
conceptually tidy, if dangerous, clash of the two superpowers has been replaced, after a
relatively short unipolar moment in which the United States blotted out the sun, by a much
more complicated multipolar world. A number of emerging regional powers, notably China,
India, and Brazil, are in a position to deny forward progress on global deadlocks unless their
interests are taken into account. The institutional framework that might allow states to manage
the new global challenges effectively must be adapted to meet these new conditions.19
With past being prologue, the story leads to the G8 and the G20, the latest in a line of efforts to
bring global order out of (potential) global chaos.
16 Kingwell, “The Many Faces of 21st Century Integration.”
17 See United States, Census Bureau, “Topics About the Hispanic Population” (Powerpoint presentation, Washington,
DC); available online at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hispanic/files/
Internet_Hispanic_in_US_2006.ppt#449,2,Topics About the Hispanic Population. 
18 Note Margaret MacMillan’s reference to the Concert of Europe, emphasizing how different were the four main
powers involved (France, Britain, Russia, Austria-Hungary); Margaret MacMillan, “What Kind of Order?” Global
Brief, 19 February 2010; available online at http://globalbrief.ca/blog/2010/01/19/what-kind-of-order/.
19 The United Nations might seem the logical place to start this task, but although the UN benefits from its universal
membership, its practices and organizational forms have proven to be famously resistant to change. Arguably only an
outside stimulus will be able to jump-start UN reform.
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G8 TO G20 
The origins of the G8 are well known and can be briefly rehearsed.20 In the uncertain years
following the 1971 collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed international exchange rates
tied to the price of gold and the 1973 oil crisis, the need for coordination of economic and
financial policy at the highest level became evident. Following informal meetings of senior
Western finance officials in 1974, French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing invited the heads
of government from the United States, Britain, West Germany, Japan, and Italy to a summit the
next year at Rambouillet. In 1976 the group was expanded to seven with the addition of
Canada (seen as a North American counterbalance to the Italians), and has met 36 times in all.
Beginning in 1994, Russia began meeting separately with G7 leaders during their summits, and
at the invitation of the United States and Britain formally joined the group in 1997 — hence
the label G8. 
The membership and working methods of the G8 are instructive. Clearly, the initial
composition of the group represented the dominant economic powers of the day, and these
shared the additional characteristics of being democratic, largely “Atlantic-oriented” and
militarily allied to the United States. The club was relatively small, and the heads of
government knew each other well “from other movies.” The opportunity to talk informally and
directly to counterparts was viewed as valuable, as was the political profile afforded by the
regular summits. In retrospect, the addition of Russia seems anomalous but, at the time, efforts
were being made to encourage that former adversary to become a standard free market liberal
democracy with a commitment to the international processes and norms that the seven
considered acceptable. This attempt to secure good behaviour through co-optation has been
only a partial success — Russia remains stubbornly Russian.21
The group’s working methods reflect the seven’s prior established habits of close consultation.
Each country appoints a personal representative of the government leader, known in the trade
as a “sherpa.” This official is a critical cog in the summit machine, and to be effective must
have direct access to and the confidence of their leader. The sherpas meet repeatedly in the run-
up to the summit to broker agenda items, communiqué language, and physical arrangements,
although by custom the leader who serves as host chair for a given year proposes the main
subject matter focus for that session as well as the meeting site. Sherpas tend to appointed for
more than one year — the practice varies from country to country — and provide both an
institutional memory and an aid to ensuring follow-up to previous commitments.
20 The literature on the G8 and the G20 has become extensive in recent years. For a historical summary of G8
development, see Peter I. Hajnal, The G8 System and the G20: Evolution, Role and Documentation (Aldershot, UK:
Ashgate, 2007). A useful bibliography can be found on the website of the University of Toronto, Munk School for
Global Affairs, G20 Information Centre, available at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/biblio/index.html. Canadian work
on these subjects can be found at the websites of the University of Victoria, Centre for Global Studies (CFGS),
available at http://www.globalcentres.org; the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), available at
http://www.cigionline.org/; and the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, available at
http://www.cdfai.org/.
21 For an account of this period from the perspective of the Clinton administration, see Strobe Talbott, The Russia
Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy (New York: Random House, 2002).
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Over the years, the G8 summits have left less and less room for direct personal interaction, and
on occasion the events have taken on a ceremonial stiffness. To a degree, of course, the intimacy
of the meetings depends on the extent to which the leaders have been at the table previously.
Rapid government turnover militates against a leader’s effectiveness in a small group setting (as,
in some cases, has lack of language facility). In terms of agendas, the main emphasis remained
on economic and financial issues, but increasingly leaders took on a broader range of topics,
from security matters to development to climate change. The overriding reality facing senior
officials was that once leaders were gathered together they talked about what seemed most
important to them at the time — whatever the pre-cooked communiqués said. By and large, the
G8 had evolved by the turn of the century into a comfortable club, an established feature of the
international landscape that guaranteed a good photo-op for leaders and conveyed a sense of
importance to their respective domestic political audiences.
By the late 1990s, however, a series of financial crises centred largely in Latin America and
Asia22 convinced the G7 finance ministers that key emerging economies were insufficiently
included in global economic management efforts. Those finance ministers had been meeting
together with their central bank governor counterparts in parallel to the G7 summits since 1986.
Their mandate had been to focus on fairly technical matters related to economic and financial
growth and stability, inflation, and currency developments.23 Now, led by Canadian finance
minister Paul Martin and US treasury secretary Lawrence Summers, discussions were expanded
to include a range of new players. After four initial meetings in 1998 and 1999 involving larger
groups of countries (the G22 and G33), in December 1999 a set grouping of twenty was
established, consisting of the G8 plus key regional powers plus the European Union.24
In the years that followed, the G20 finance ministers group proved its worth as a way of
opening up and rationalizing the international dialogue. Martin, in particular, was struck by its
effectiveness. In a key article in Foreign Affairs in 2005, he pointed to the lessons he
maintained could be drawn from the experience of this expanded representation.
First, some decisions — no matter how technical — can only be made
at the political level. Second, despite the many differences that exist
within the group, there are also surprisingly large areas of
commonality; all the countries are wrestling with similar issues and
have drawn similar lessons from past failures. Third, when national
decision-makers discuss issues openly and frankly, it is remarkable
how much can be accomplished (never underestimate the value of peer
pressure in getting to yes). The G20 has also allowed world leaders to
move from a focus on crisis management to a focus on steady
improvement in international economic stability and predictability.25
22 Mexico 1994, Indonesia/South Korea/Thailand 1997-1998, Russia 1998, Brazil 1998-2002, Turkey 1999-2002,
Argentina 2000-2001.
23 Interestingly, this grouping has been so useful to participants that it continues to meet separately (and generally
without Russia) despite the arrival of the G20.
24 The additional countries are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South
Africa, South Korea, and Turkey.
25 Paul Martin, “A Global Answer to Global Problems,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2005.
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Based on the experience of finance ministers and central bank governors, Martin became
convinced that this group should meet at the heads of government level as well. During his
term as Canadian prime minister (2003 to 2006), he campaigned actively for the idea with his
counterparts, and driven in part through a network of think tanks around the world, the
approach developed currency.26
In the meantime, the practical disadvantages occasioned by the unrepresentative nature of G8
membership were becoming clearer. The chair of the 2005 summit, UK prime minister Tony
Blair, responded by inviting five key developing countries — Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and
South Africa — to the Gleneagles meeting. The 2007 Heiligendamm summit regularized the
relationship among the “G8+5,” establishing a schedule for regular ministerial meetings among
the 13 countries to cover four areas.27 The Heiligendamm Process was scheduled for review at
the G8 summit in 2009, but well before then the approach of inviting the heads of government
of important countries to the occasional meal during summits dominated by developed countries
had become bankrupt — and indeed insulting to developing countries and their leaders.28
The Process was only a transitional step in the direction of inclusiveness. It reflected the view
of many leaders, including the then-new UK prime minister Gordon Brown and French
president Nicolas Sarkozy, that expansion at the summit level was inevitable. What was
lacking was the crisis to make significant institutional change seem necessary — and in 2008,
the crisis arrived. 
By the fall of that year, the US economy was in free fall, triggered initially by bank failures
and a housing market collapse. Stock markets around the world plunged. At the end of
October, just prior to the presidential election, a lame-duck President George W. Bush called
together the leaders of the G20 countries to “review progress being made to address the current
financial crisis, advance a common understanding of its causes and, in order to avoid a
repetition, agree on a common set of principles for reform of the regulatory and institutional
regimes for the world’s financial sectors.”29 The 14-15 November 2008 meetings were not
small, including as they did the leaders of the IMF and the World Bank, as well UN secretary-
general Ban Ki-moon and the chair of the Financial Stability Forum. In addition, Spain and the
Netherlands insisted on being present and were supported in this effort by the French president.
26 In 2003 Martin had encouraged the CFGS and CIGI to combine their efforts to flesh out the concept of a leaders’
G20. Those think tanks worked with an array of international partners to produce a collection of research that
addressed the many real-world obstacles and opportunities related to establish this new process. See, in particular, the
CFGS website, available at http://www.l20.org/; and the accounts of the research project by Peter Heap,
Globalization and Summit Reform: An Experiment in International Governance (Ottawa: Springer/International
Development Research Centre, 2008); and idem, “Breaking Global Deadlocks: A Canadian Track 1.5 Success”
(Calgary: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, September 2009).
27
“Promoting and protecting innovation; enhancing freedom of investment by means of an open investment climate
including strengthening the principles of corporate social responsibility; defining joint responsibilities for
development focusing specifically on Africa; and joint access to know-how to improve energy efficiency and
technology cooperation with the aim of contributing to reducing CO2 emissions.” See Heiligendamm Process
declaration, available online at http://www.g-8.de/Content/EN/Artikel/__g8-summit/2007-06-08-heiligendamm-
prozess__en.html. Starting in 2000, G8 hosts began to invite a variable collection of leaders from developing
countries in Africa and Asia to meetings on the margins of the summits.
28 The +5 approach had the additional unwelcome consequence (from the G8 perspective) of generating what was, in
essence, a new competing group, the G5, complete with secretariat and summit schedule of its own. So much for the
efficacy of half-measures. 
29 Statement by White House spokesperson Dana Perino, quoted in the Washington Post, 22 October 2008.
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The litmus test of this first G20 summit’s success at a time of high financial peril was the
simple commitment to meet again. In London in April 2009 and Pittsburgh in September the
same year, leaders subsequently hammered out a common approach that included coordinating
economic stimulus packages (and eventually steps to extricate themselves from them),
avoiding protectionism, addressing global imbalances, tripling the financial resources of the
IMF (thereby re-invigorating a moribund institution), and working out stricter rules for banks,
hedge funds, and other financial players. The general view is that the first three G20 summits
can be counted as successes, especially when the potential alternatives are considered.30 In the
wake of the fourth summit, the outlook is a little less clear, perhaps because the immediate
pressure of impending financial doom has been relieved. 
TORONTO/HUNTSVILLE OUTCOMES 
An assessment of the dual outcomes of the Huntsville G8 and the Toronto G20 depends on the
perspective taken. From a domestic political viewpoint, Prime Minister Harper seems to have
gained a measure of credibility in some quarters as a leader with a specific, if limited, agenda,
which he pursued more or less successfully through the two summits. 
The G8 adopted the Canadian-led Muskoka Initiative, aimed at accelerating progress on the
UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 4 (reducing child mortality) and 5 (improving
maternal health),31 but in the process the Canadian government enmeshed itself in a
controversy over funding abortion in developing countries. Although this subject area is
undoubtedly important in its own right, the choice of initiative seems to have been essentially a
political call related to improving the government’s standing with domestic constituencies. The
G20 focus was more negative in impulse, centred on the Canadian campaign to block
agreement on an international bank tax (and to put forward an alternative, embedded
contingent capital). In the event, the G20 Toronto Summit Declaration contented itself with
stating, “Some countries are pursuing a financial levy. Other countries are pursuing different
approaches.”32 While this modest outcome had the effect of permitting Canada to continue
regulating its financial sector on its own terms, the prolonged wrangle over the bank tax called
into question the consensual approach that had been successfully developed at earlier G20
summits in the face of the financial meltdown. 
30 For a rather contrary view, see Katinka Barysch, “Whatever Happened to the G20?” (London: Centre for European
Reform, 14 April 2010); available online at http://centreforeuropeanreform.blogspot.com/ 2010/04/whatever-
happened-to-g20.html. Barysch emphasizes the need for G20 leaders to concentrate on unfinished business and resist
the temptation of broadening the agenda. She also suggests that leaders focus on the task of integrating the G20 into
the existing systems of global governance.
31
“The Initiative is related to MDGs 4 and 5, as well as elements of MDGs 1 (nutrition) and 6 (HIV/AIDS, malaria). It
focuses on achieving significant progress on strengthening health systems in developing countries that face high
burdens of maternal and under-five child mortality and an unmet need for family planning. Improving maternal and
under-five child health requires comprehensive, high-impact, and integrated interventions at the community level,
across the continuum of care —  that is, pre-pregnancy, pregnancy, childbirth, infancy, and early childhood.” For the
full text of the Muskoka Declaration, of which the Initiative was a part, see online at http://g8.gc.ca/g8-
summit/summit-documents/g8-muskoka-declaration-recovery-and-new-beginnings/. 
32 See the full text of the Declaration online at http://g20.gc.ca/toronto-summit/summit-documents/the-g-20-toronto-
summit-declaration/. 
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More broadly, the Canadian strategy towards the two summits reflected uncertainty about
objectives and institutions. The prime minister continued to support a separate role for the G8,
notwithstanding the growing influence of the more inclusive G20. The notion seemed to be
that, although the G20 was the self-proclaimed “premier forum for our international economic
cooperation,”33 a fairly hard line could be drawn between economic and financial questions
and all the other subjects of global discussion. In fact, the Huntsville/Toronto experience
suggests strongly that a distinction of this sort may be very difficult to sustain, and indeed is
probably less than useful. A few examples illustrate the point.
The Muskoka Declaration covered development issues extensively, and they were also
referenced in the Toronto document. Given that the G20 contains a number of critical
developing countries, the emphasis on development in the G8 context continues the mindset of
seeing development issues as a set of solutions to be imposed on or gifted to less-developed
societies by the wise people of the West.  Moreover, artificial sectoral divisions make little
sense in a globalized world. In the words of the Muskoka Declaration itself, “Prosperity,
development and security are inextricably linked, and the economic well being and security of
our own countries and those around the world are therefore interdependent.”
The Declaration goes on to opine about several subjects — notably international trade and
investment, climate change, and some individual security issues — where the key players are
in fact G20 members (for example, China, India, Brazil) and not part of the G8. With the two
meetings being so close, the juxtaposition seems odd. One would think a more productive
discussion of these subjects would be more likely to occur in the more inclusive forum (the
next day). 
As a final example, even the signature Canadian initiative on child and maternal health fitted a
bit uncomfortably within the restrictive G8 rubric. Noting that support from the G8 is intended
to be “catalytic,” the Declaration welcomed the support of a somewhat motley assortment of
“outside” donors — the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Spain, and
Switzerland, as well as the UN Foundation and the Gates Foundation. South Korea is a G20
member, but the other five countries share the characteristic of feeling “left out” of the top
table, so presumably would welcome inclusion wherever possible. Support for the Millennium
Development Goals is included in the G20 Declaration (which also refers to establishment of a
G20 Working Group on Development), but the crosswalks between the two summits in this
important area were left quite unclear.
Perhaps this was the way in which the Canadian hosting effort was the least satisfying, because
it represented a lost opportunity. Being the first country to host G8 and G20 summits back-to-
back afforded Canada a chance to shape the international debate over effective global
governance (especially as regards the renovation of international financial institutions). The
eventual outcome of the two events did not illuminate the respective roles of the two
gatherings so much as it demonstrated the confusion over them. It could be argued that Toronto
(as opposed to Huntsville) by its very existence served to “cement” key developing countries
33 For the text of the Pittsburgh Summit Leaders’ Declaration containing this phrase, see online at
http://g20.gc.ca/toronto-summit/summit-documents/the-g-20-toronto-summit-declaration/. 
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into global decision-making but, equally, a case could be made that the G20 needed more time
to work through the ambitious work program set in motion by the two G20 meetings (London
and Pittsburgh) held in 2009, and that a more complete response could be expected by the time
of the Seoul G20 in November 2010. Although France will host both a G8 and a G20 in 2011
(at different times of the year), it can be expected that President Sarkozy will not be shy to take
up the challenge of making a lasting impact in the run-up to his next presidential election
(2014). His past statements might have suggested that an amalgamated G13 could emerge after
the 2011 meetings,34 but more recent speeches suggest a commitment to the existing G20.35
Either way, Canada will not lead the debate for a long time; our next G20 chairmanship will
occur in 20 years.
The lost opportunity does not simply rest on matters of organizational form. The financial
collapse of 2008-2009 has occasioned a series of substantive disagreements, whether over
specific measures to extricate the world economy from its current mess (centred on the need to
control debt and deficit levels versus the need for continued fiscal stimulus) or more
fundamentally (after the fall of the Berlin Wall) over the nature of capitalism itself.36
On 28 January 2010, at the World Economic Forum, Prime Minister Harper spoke about the
approach he would be taking to the upcoming G8 and G20 summits.37 He reflected on the
“fellowship of the lifeboat” that had brought together states at the height of the global
economic crisis, initially at the 2008 G20 summit and subsequently in London and Pittsburgh.
He stressed the need for the G20 to develop and sustain a sense of shared responsibility for the
health of the global economy. He discerned “an important role of the Group of Eight in non-
economic matters, in promoting democracy, development, peace, and security,” and he pointed
to the health concerns of children and women as a field where the G8 could take the lead. In
short, the prime minister prefigured the approach he would take at Huntsville and Toronto.
What he did not do, however, was to fit these individual institutional mandates and project
initiatives into a larger pattern that would explain both the relationship among complex issues
and the ways states could work together to manage the impacts of globalization more
effectively. And it was this intellectual void, more than the extraordinary cost of security
arrangements or the back and forth around abortion or bank taxes, which caused the two
summits to be regarded as somewhat empty exercises, competently presented, but lacking in
substance at a critical juncture.
34 Sarkozy was quoted in September 2008 as saying, “The twenty-first-century world cannot be governed with the
institutions of the twentieth century.” He argued that inclusion of today’s emerging powers is not just “a matter
fairness” but a necessary condition for “being able to act effectively.” He cautioned, “We cannot wait any longer to
enlarge the Security Council. We cannot wait any longer to turn the G8 into the G13 or G14 and to bring in China,
India, South Africa, Mexico, and Brazil.” Quoted in James Joyner, “Sarkozy Calls for Security Council and G*
Expansion,” Atlantic Update, 25 September 2008; available online at http://www.acus.org/atlantic_update/sarkozy-
calls-security-council-and-g8-expansion. Now that a G20 exists, a reduction in summit numbers would be extremely
difficult to push through.
35 Nicolas Sarkozy, Speech to the 40th World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland, 27 January 2010; available online
at http://www.weforum.org/pdf/Sarkozy_en.pdf.
36 David Brooks, “The Larger Struggle,” New York Times, 14 June 2010; available online at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/15/opinion/15.Brooks.html?emc+eta1ooks. Brooks draws attention to the struggle
between democratic capitalism and state capitalism as described in Ian Bremmer’s The End of the Free Market: Who
Wins the War between States and Corporations? (New York: Portfolio, 2010).
37 Stephen Harper, Address to the 40th World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland, 28 January 2010; available online
at http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=2&pageId=46&id=3101.
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LESSONS LEARNED AND WAYS FORWARD AFTER TORONTO
In the wake of the fourth G20 summit (and the thirty-sixth G8), a stock-taking is in order. A
significant attempt has been made to rework international decision-making machinery to take
better account of the contemporary distribution of power among nation-states, especially in the
economic field. More specifically, the ways in which government leaders can intervene have
been enhanced and the number of key players has been multiplied. Paradoxically, the top table
has been expanded but, arguably, now that such major powers as the Chinese, the Indians, and
the Brazilians are safely “inside the tent,” those previously left out have even less clout now.
The resulting changes can be analyzed from a number of perspectives.
The Role of Leaders 
The multi-country summit format is unlikely to disappear in the short term because it reflects
the move away from a world dominated by a small number of countries (although, realistically,
while all summit countries are equal, some countries are more equal than others). The summits
also answer to the evidence that many serious international problems are interrelated and only
government leaders can act to resolve cross-sectoral deadlocks. Specifically, only they are in a
position to make the necessary large political tradeoffs, especially as summit agendas move
away from technical financial issues and towards sensitive and multi-dimensional areas such as
climate change. 
A major activity at summits is for leaders to promise collective action in other established
international forums. The track record in this regard is uneven, to say the least. With respect to
the recent and ongoing financial crisis, the G20’s agreements at London and Pittsburgh
probably headed off a depression — although much work remains. By contrast, calls at
successive G8 and G20 summits to move the Doha trade round forward have resulted in little
meaningful progress, and leaders’ pledges to deal with the impact of climate change did not
prevent the recent debacle in Copenhagen.     
On a year-to-year basis, the personal relationships established at summits remain as critical
now as they were in the days of Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Wilson in Paris, or Roosevelt
and Churchill on Prince of Wales. Perhaps as valuable as any summit outcome is the empathy
that leaders can develop for each other’s situations (especially politically). The experience of
coming to understand and share the choices and dilemmas only leaders face can be
transformative.38 As always, a compelling personality can cause a country to have more
influence than might be otherwise expected. Brazil’s growing weight under President Luiz
In cio Lula da Silva provides a case in point, and it will be interesting to see how that country
fares after Lula’s term expires at the end of this year.
38 For a recent insightful exploration of the role of empathy, see Jeremy Rifkin, The Empathic Civilization: The Race to
Global Consciousness in a World in Crisis (New York: Tarcher/Penguin, 2009).
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Summits force detailed preparation and compromise because leaders cannot afford public
failures. For officials and ministers, summit dates provide often useful deadlines by which
work is to be completed. Conversely, if the G20 turns out to be ineffective, leaders will
abandon it as a mechanism. In the end, it is likely to be unsentimental political imperative that
causes leaders to recognize that the G8 has outlived its usefulness — although the grouping
may live on (below the level of leaders) as a caucus of like-minded democracies (a category
into which Russia fits somewhat uncomfortably). Finally, notwithstanding the press coverage
surrounding summits and their outcomes, leaders probably have the clearest understanding that
these meetings are a far cry from world government. Prime Minister Harper is characteristic of
most leaders in noting the continued primacy of sovereign states but seeing the possibility for a
natural extension of national self-interest through cooperation, which, over time, could produce
what he calls “enlightened sovereignty.”39
Summit Mandates
Globalization is proceeding along many dimensions of networked interdependence, few of
which come to the personal attention of government leaders, either acting alone or in groups
(of whatever number). Anne-Marie Slaughter, who has pioneered academic work in this area
and now heads the Policy Planning unit in Hillary Clinton’s State Department, believes that
“The emerging networked world of the twenty-first century…exists above the state, below the
state, and through the state.”40 From this perspective, summits such as the G8 and the G20
amount to an effort by the heads of government to bring together the various threads that run
through the fabric of international relations and to make sense of the pattern of events, both for
their own decision-making purposes and to reassure electorates who tend to see the world
increasingly as random and unpredictable. The summits are a demonstration of control,
evidence that the heads of government are fully “plugged in” or connected. Slaughter has a
cautionary word, however, about the ability of even the best “connected” leader to direct
events: “The power that flows from this type of connectivity is not the power to impose
outcomes. Networks are not directed and controlled as much as they are managed and
orchestrated.41
In the end, the ability of leaders to control events is probably as illusory as the general’s battle
plan — once the fighting begins, improvisation is all.
Summits are not purely symbolic, of course. They often provoke decisions or, at least,
movement on specific issues. Politicians are usually pragmatic people, however, and the
likelihood does not seem high that they will allow two high-level coordinating bodies such as
the G8 and the G20 to co-exist indefinitely with mandates which seem to overlap.
39 Harper, Address to the 40th World Economic Forum.
40 Anne-Marie Slaughter, “America’s Edge: Power in the Networked Century,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2009;
available online at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/63722.
41 Ibid.
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The G20 was originally called into existence to deal with the international financial crisis and,
for the moment, this continues to be its focus. Certainly Prime Minister Harper’s view is that
the G20 should concern itself with “financial sector reform, stimulus programs and global trade
and growth strategies”; by contrast, the G8 should deal with “non-economic matters, in
promoting democracy, development, peace and security.” Under this latter heading he would
place discussion of terrorism, piracy, climate change, and nuclear proliferation.42
British prime minister David Cameron has a similar view about the G8, seeing it as becoming
less formal, focused on strategic security issues, and perhaps scheduled on the sidelines of UN
or NATO meetings to save money. “I don’t think the G8 will die out,” Cameron said. “The
wealthiest democracies coming together for a strategic discussion, to hammer out a common
view on things like Afghanistan, Iran and Middle East peace process is still a really important
thing to do.”43 
In 2009, Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi listed his priorities for the G8 summit at
L’Aquila as financial regulation, climate change, and international trade, a grab-bag of topics
that mirrored the chaotic meeting, held in the midst of an earthquake-torn city. The division of
labour between the G8 and the G20 was left unclear.
French president Nicolas Sarkozy is now a strong G20 supporter. In a recent speech in Davos,
he stated, “we cannot govern globalization while relegating half of Humanity to the sidelines,
without India, Africa or Latin America.” He went on to claim rather portentously, “The G20
foreshadows the planetary governance of the 21st century. It symbolizes the return of politics
whose legitimacy was denied by unregulated globalization.”44 These comments suggest a
much more limited role for the G8, but France retains its chairmanship of that group in 2011
(albeit not at the same time as the G20 meeting it is also chairing), and shows no inclination so
far to disestablish the smaller summit it originated in 1975. 
The adjustments that may be made to the focus of the G8 are difficult to predict, and there are
no guarantees that the G20 will simply subsume it. That being said, the host countries for the
next three summits (France, the United States, and Britain) are likely to want to put their own
stamp on the machinery of global governance, so the possibility of institutional change seems
fairly high.
Summit Participation 
Earlier discussions of the need for a more representative body than the G8 model tended to
treat with circumspection the question of who would qualify for inclusion. There were the
obvious candidates (China, India, Brazil), and then there were “the rest,” a group difficult to
define precisely, beyond notions of regional importance. In the event, the existence of the G20
finance ministers group provided a helpful template, and the Americans simply adopted that
roster for the first G20 summit.
42 Harper, Address to the 40th World Economic Forum.
43 Quoted in “Cameron sees role for G8 despite rise of G20,” IBTimes, 28 June 2010; available online at
http://uk.ibtimes.com/articles/20100628/cameron-sees-role-for-g8-despite-rise-of-g20.htm. 
44 Sarkozy, Speech to the 40th World Economic Forum.
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The question arises, of course, whether the addition of new states to the summit table will
make a substantive differences to the decisions reached around it. As expressed by Andrew
Cooper and Paola Subacchi, “the fundamental question that must be asked in this case…is
whether the current change process attempts to integrate emerging powers into the established
system or accepts differences (non-likemindedness) and focuses on problem-solving.”45 These
are early days in the G20’s existence, and a judgment on this basic issue must be suspended,
but at least two observations can be made. 
First, the simple addition of developing/”southern” countries may alter the agenda items
leaders consider but in no way assures greater effectiveness in generating agreement.
Experience in the WTO, for example, suggests rather the contrary.46 Nonetheless, altering the
international discourse in the direction of the concerns and aspirations of developing countries
is worthwhile in itself, even if in the short term there is a lag in also altering the sensibilities of
partner countries in the developed world.
Second, the process of building the southern networks that will bring new ideas to the table is
well under way, whether through the ASEAN input to the G20’s Asian 6 or through the
Committee of 10, created during the November 2008 meeting of African finance ministers and
central bank governors.47
Finally, there are the many countries left out of the G20 and resentful of the fact. In an
interview with Spiegel/Online immediately before the Toronto summit, Jonas Gahr Store, the
Norwegian foreign minister, voiced the feelings of many of those on the outside. He
characterized the G20 “in terms of international cooperation, (as) one of the greatest setbacks
since World War II.” He questioned the group’s legitimacy, adding, 
The G-20 is a self-appointed group. Its composition is determined by
the major countries and powers. It may be more representative than the
G-7 or the G-8, in which only the richest countries are represented, but
it is still arbitrary. We no longer live in the 19th century, a time when
the major powers met and redrew the map of the world. No one needs
a new Congress of Vienna.48
46
“No good deed goes unpunished: the WTO’s timely responsiveness in accommodating the new powers at the heart of
its decision-making has produced new inefficiencies, has heightened its proclivity to deadlock, and has exacerbated
disengagement and disillusionment among all its stakeholders”; Amrita Narlikar, “New Powers in the Club: The
Challenges of Global Trade Governance,” International Affairs 86 (3, 2010): 724.
47 See the useful post by Leonardo Martinez-Diaz and Ngaire Woods, “The G20 and the Developing World,” Global
Brief, 19 February 2010, available online at http://globalbrief.ca/blog/2010/02/19/the-g20-and-the-developing-world/,
in which they discuss their recent study, Networks of Influence? Developing Countries in a Networked Global Order
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). For the ASEAN activities, see Wendy Dobson, “The Financial Crisis and
East Asia,” East Asia Forum, 26 July 2009; available online at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/26/the-
financial-crisis-and-east-asia-/.  For a report on the Committee of 10, see the African Development Bank’s website at
http://www.afdb.org/en/ news-events/article/committee-of-ten-meeting-cape-town-21-february-2010/.
48 For the interview, see “Norway Takes Aim at G-20,” Spiegel Online, 22 June 2010; available at
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,druck-702104,00.html. 
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The G20 may be generally acceptable as a temporary expedient to meet a specific crisis, but in
some quarters resistance remains to its becoming a permanent “steering committee” for the
world.49
Summit Agendas
As a practical matter, the agendas of both the G8 and the G20 are largely based on the
activities of previous summits. The G20 in particular has a considerable work program to
complete, and much effort is being expended to ensure that the momentum for reform is not
lost as the financial crisis eases. If the global economy continues to recover and avoids a
double-dip recession, there may be room to consider other topics for the G20 to address. In this
regard, both agendas (those of the G8 and the G20) are subject to direction from the chair for a
given meeting.
For all the inertia built in to summit agendas, the subjects to be covered by the G20 will act as
a “canary in the mineshaft,” signifying the purchase that ideas generated from the newly
arrived “twelve” gain on the attention of the leaders as a whole. The current G20 agenda
reflects issues of particular interest to the financial communities in the United States and
Britain, Wall Street and the City, their government regulators in the two countries, and the
massive array of ancillary lobbyists and hangers-on.50 The emerging economy countries now
on the G20 recognize the need to regularize international markets but feel strongly that issues
in such areas as development, social equity, and climate change deserve attention as well.
South Korea’s determination to place development (and possibly cyber security) on the agenda
of the G20 meeting it will host in November 2010 is an early indication of changes that may
flow from a more inclusive summit membership.
Summit Management 
A simple but important implication of moving to the G20 format is that the sherpa-led
preparations become much more complex. Trying to develop summit agendas that work for
twenty, rather than eight, heads of government is exponentially more difficult. Sherpa
operations (especially in host countries) therefore are likely to grow (and cost more). If G20
agendas begin to shift away from financial matters, the role of finance ministers and their
deputies, however, will decrease — indeed, they may prefer to take these questions back from
the heads of governments’ table to the safer confines of financial boardrooms.
49 For a discussion of the possible institutional development of the G20 in these two directions, see Andrew F. Cooper,
“The G20 as an Improvised Crisis Committee and/or a Contested ‘Steering Committee’ for the World,” International
Affairs 86 (3, 2010): 741-757.
50 For a useful description of the Anglo-American financial crisis and the role regulatory capture has played (and may
continue to play in the G20 context), see Andrew Baker, “Restraining Regulatory Capture? Anglo-America, Crisis
Politics, and Trajectories of Change in Global Financial Governance,” International Affairs 86 (3, 2010): 647-663.
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Based on past experience with the G8, G20 leaders are quite likely to want to expand their
horizons beyond the financial and economic fields. This may leave more room for a role for
G20 foreign ministers. That being said, a noteworthy phenomenon in this regard is the
inevitable political rivalry between heads of government on the one hand and ministers on the
other. When left alone in the room, leaders can be extraordinarily dismissive of the talents of
even the most prominent of their cabinet colleagues, and generally have absolutely no interest
in sharing the limelight.51 More inclusive or not, the need for leaders to express their primacy
will not change, so again, the key management figures are likely to remain the personal
representatives of the leaders.
The dynamics of a twenty-way conversation are daunting — especially since as a practical
matter many more than twenty people often end up being at the table. In Pittsburgh, for
example, the number was around 55 (this included finance ministers on an exceptional basis).
More thought must be given to cutting back on the number of people in the room to make the
exchanges between leaders as personal and informal as possible. Meals are useful in fostering
direct contacts, and other formats (perhaps breaking into smaller groups) should be explored to
generate exchanges that are not completely scripted by bureaucrats.
A final management note. If the Huntsville/Toronto events proved anything, it was that having
back-to-back summits was a poor idea. Certainly, the security and administrative costs seemed
to climb in these circumstances. More important, holding the G8 immediately before the G20
simply reinforced the impression that the latter body was operating off the agenda of a more
select (more Western) group. Perhaps the Cameron suggestion of informal meetings around UN
or NATO meetings might be a way of eventually giving the G8 a decent burial.
Summit Accountability 
Leaders understand the public impatience with successive expensive summits that seem long
on rhetoric and short on accomplishments. At the G8 in L’Aquila, leaders therefore
commissioned a report from officials “reviewing our achievements up to now.” In addition, the
leaders stated, “We are determined to fully take on our responsibilities, and are committed to
implementing our decisions and to adopting a full and comprehensive accountability
mechanism by 2010 to monitor progress and strengthen the effectiveness of our actions.”
In due course, at Huntsville a first instalment of this sort of report was presented in the form of
the Muskoka Accountability Report.52 Although it was limited to commitments related to
development, the demand for more comprehensive reporting will be difficult to resist, whether
related to the G8 or to the G20.53 One way of dealing with accountability in the longer term
might be to assign the reporting function to a network of G20 think tanks — which might take
on this retrospective task in addition to any specific pieces of forward-looking research leaders
might wish accomplished. 
51 This was certainly the case at the G8 summits attended in the 1990s by one of the authors.
52 The report and its background are available online at http://g8.gc.ca/g8-summit/accountability/. 
53 For a listing of G20 compliance reports, see online at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/analysis/ index.html#compliance.
For the latest of the very useful G8 compliance reports prepared by the G8 Research Group at the University of
Toronto, see the 2009 L’Aquila G8 Summit Final Compliance Report, available online at
http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2009compliance-final/index.html.
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Summit Legitimacy 
The question of legitimacy is liable to come up with respect to the G20, just as it did with
respect to the G8. The G20 is as much a self-appointed club as the G8, but the addition of key
(very large) developing countries gives the more inclusive summit some of the “feel” of
credible global governance. If the main measure of legitimacy is full representativeness, of
course, then the G20 is no more legitimate than its predecessor. G20 membership is based, not
very precisely, on economic weight and regional importance. More immediately, the G8 states
were prepared to accept the G20’s coming into being because the major emerging economies
needed to be included if the financial crisis of 2007-2008 was to be managed effectively.54 In
the end, the legitimacy of the G20 will be judged by its effectiveness in prompting constructive
actions in other, legally constituted, bodies. Powerful though the G20 members may be, if their
activities are seen as arbitrary and completely self-serving, the group will lose the ability to
influence other states, and its usefulness (and existence) will come to an end. 
The G20’s Impact on Other Organizations and Processes 
Although concerns have been expressed that the G20 may supersede or override existing
international institutions, there seems little basis for this anxiety. In fact, the G20 has breathed
fresh life into the IMF and prompted a productive debate on the ways in which the Bretton
Woods institutions more generally are governed. For organizations with serious deadlock issues
(notably the WTO), the G20 may offer the only possibility for generating forward motion.
There is even an outside possibility that G20 success might make Security Council reform
somewhat easier to contemplate since many of the key players are part of the twenty.55 More
generally, the experience so far suggests that an effective G20 does not mean the end of the
UN’s usefulness, it contributes to it. 
A final cautionary observation is in order. The intention here is not to presuppose that the G20
will eventually be counted a “success,” whether in terms of the limited (but nonetheless
important) context of the recent global financial crisis, or in terms of a longer-term existence as
an international forum. As mentioned at the beginning of this piece, the historical record of
attempts to manage events at a global scale is not encouraging. For the moment, however, the
G20 offers the most practical mechanism available for addressing a complex threat to the
world economy. Whether the grouping evolves into something more (for example, a more
permanent instrument of global governance) remains to be seen.   
A CANADIAN APPROACH 
The way the international community makes collective decisions is rapidly evolving. In this
regard, a number of factors apply specifically to Canada. Some of these will require Canada to
adjust its tactics to meet national objectives, but many are solid advantages. 
54 For a discussion of G20 legitimacy and the impact on the “marginal majority” of states left out of this new body, see
Anthony Payne, “How Many Gs Are There in ‘Global Governance’ after the Crisis? The Perspectives of the
‘Marginal Majority’ of the World’s States,” International Affairs 86 (3, 2010): 729-740, esp. 738-740.
55 Although the entrenched positions of the current P5 cast doubt on the likelihood of meaningful reform any time soon.
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After World War II, at the time of the last major realignment of international institutions,
Canada had significant comparative advantages, including consequential armed forces, an
undamaged homeland, and a burgeoning economy. Accordingly, as one of the senior Allies,
Canada played a major role in crafting new bodies such as the IMF, the World Bank, the
United Nations, and NATO. This circumstance no longer applies; Canada’s comparative
international weight has diminished.
It should be recalled that Canada was only added to the G6 in 1976 because the Americans and
Germans wanted a North American country to balance Italy.  Since then, Canada’s relative
international standing has eroded further. In the trade field, for example, the Quad countries
that worked together to broker breakthroughs in trade talks consisted originally of the United
States, the EC/EU, Japan, and Canada. With the advent of the new century and the Doha round,
that inner group has grown to five or six — the United States, the EU, Japan, Australia, Brazil,
and India, but no longer Canada, which is now part of the “alternative” Oslo Group that
includes Norway, New Zealand, Kenya, Indonesia, and Chile.56 The point here is that Canada’s
place at international “top tables” is by no means guaranteed.
One positive aspect of Canada’s geopolitical positioning, however, remains in place.
Especially since World War II, its privileged relationship with the United States has been an
ongoing advantage, and this close connection with the single most militarily powerful country
in the world will continue to be a strategic plus. While on the economic side, the era of US
dominance may be coming an end, close, tariff-free ties to this large, dynamic market will be
extremely valuable for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, this key bilateral relationship
cannot be taken for granted; as many experts and former practitioners have commented, its care
and feeding will require additional resources.57
Turning to what might be termed structural advantages, Canada has a stable, democratic
political system supported by one of the most effective legal systems in the world. It has an
open market economy governed by a fair, predictable regulatory system. Canada is an
ethnically diverse country, with long experience integrating disparate groups with differing
cultures, and a history (at least for the past 60 years) of tolerance and respect for human rights.
A special national advantage is the significant representation in its population from two of the
key rising powers, China and India.
Canada has a solid regulatory framework in the financial field; its economy has emerged in
generally healthy condition from the recent financial crisis. In part this reflects the balanced
approach that successive Canadian governments have adopted — they have supported the free
market but developed a functioning social safety net to complement it.
56 See the description and history of the Quad and other trade negotiation groups on the WTO website at
http://www.wto.org/english/thew_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org3_e.htm. 
57 See, for example, the call for Canada to become “America’s indispensable ally” while diversifying its relationships
with the emerging powers; Canadian International Council, Open Canada: A Global Positioning Strategy for a
Networked Age (Toronto: CIC, 2010), p. 20; available online at http://www.onlinecic.org/opencanada.
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In terms of other underlying economic strengths, Canada has a privileged geographic position
(which among other things makes it less vulnerable to uncontrolled migration), a full range of
key raw materials, abundant fresh water and arable land, a good mix of energy sources, well-
developed internal and external transportation and communications linkages, and, perhaps most
important, a highly educated population (which continued openness to immigration will keep
from aging too rapidly).
By comparison with these positives, Canada’s prospects in the new G20 world are decidedly
more mixed. In the wake of the Huntsville and Toronto summits, Canada will not chair the G8
for eight years (if the forum lasts that long) or the G20 for nineteen. The next chairs will take
initiatives of their own, and leaders such as Sarkozy, Obama, and Cameron will not be shy to
push their personal priorities. If the United States and China reach a strategic modus vivendi,
this central “G2” could well drive the G20’s development, perhaps joined by India and the EU
(if the former can deal effectively with poverty and the latter with disunity). The impact of
South Korea as the next G20 chair (the first Asian mid-size country to take on this leadership
role) may also be considerable in changing the trajectory of summit agendas. In retrospect,
Canada may have this year missed a critical opportunity to shape the G20’s future. Canada
must now find a way of ensuring its interests are recognized and taken account of in this
increasingly crowded setting.  
A collection of “new” international actors is refusing to “play by the rules.” The most obvious
recent example was the démarche by the leaders of Turkey and Brazil with respect to Iran’s
nuclear program. Jaswant Singh, former Indian foreign minister, suggests that the United States
in particular had better get used to “these types of diplomatic cat’s cradles.” He points to a
collection of countries in addition to Turkey and Brazil with global or regional policies of their
own (he lists India, Indonesia, Japan, South Africa, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and South
Korea). He warns against an attempt to impose a United States/China condominium on the
global order: “Too many powerful countries now feel able to flex their diplomatic muscles in
defense of their interests. Mao’s hundred flowers may have bloomed only briefly, but today’s
myriad species of Weltpolitik are certain to bloom perennially.”58 
Despite the G20, the G8 continues to exist and, as Mr. Singh suggests, the Western powers will
be tempted to try to foist their own agenda on the newcomers. The chief among those
newcomers, China, has already made it clear that the only consequence of this would be the
establishment of a competing “G12.”59 Something similar has already happened with the
“outreach 5,” invited to earlier G8 meetings in the 1990s. The effect of treating these five
major states (China, India, Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa) as occasional dinner guests was
to force them to establish a separate collective personality – in fact, the core of a new G12. It is
entirely unclear that it would be in Canada’s best interests for it to find itself in one of two
competing “blocs” at the summit level, and it should work to remove the incentives for the new
G20 members to form such a sub-group. 
In light of this overall situation, Canada should consider the following directions. 
58 Jaswant Singh, “A hundred Weltpolitiks,” Japan Times, 23 June 2010; available online at
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/eo20100623al.html.
59 Gordon S. Smith, “The last thing we need is a G12 competing with a G8,” Globe and Mail, 26 July 2010; available
online at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/the-last-thing-we-need-is-a-g12-competing-with-a-g8/.
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Embrace a Realistic Assessment of Canadian Capabilities 
Canada will have influence only if it can make itself useful and demonstrate competence (as it
has in the field of financial regulation). Canada has many advantages in this regard, not least of
which is a cadre of extremely competent officials dealing with international matters (now
supplemented by a growing representation of Canadians in key positions in international
organizations). The particular circumstances that led to Canada’s having a disproportionate
impact immediately after World War II and through the 1950s undoubtedly have changed, but
the logical response to feelings of loss at the passage of the “Pearsonian moment” should not
be paralysis but constructive action. Canadian leaders should keep in mind that electors often
view performance in the international sphere as a surrogate indicator of general competence.
Being seen as wilfully allowing Canada’s international standing to diminish has domestic
political consequences for those seeking to retain high elected office.  
Build New Relationships 
Canada needs to refine its networks and privileged relationships with the new players at and
around the G20 table.60 At a minimum, Canada should maintain its primordial relationship
with the United States, devise a meaningful connection with the EU, work on developing
multi-dimensional links with China, India, and Brazil, and fashion a leadership role with other
second-level powers inside and outside the G20. Canada must learn to sustain multiple,
interlinked relationships, and it should be inventive in determining the different kinds of
common interests that make new international alliances possible. The key may be to build on
the strengths and experiences of Canada’s own diverse population. The days of relying on a
single main partner (historically Britain, latterly the United States) are over.
Shape Renewed Global Institutions
Canada has a long-term interest in developing and maintaining effective international
institutions. To meet its objectives, it needs to be among the rules-makers (as opposed to the
rules-takers) of the international community. For Canada, issues of institutional architecture are
not theoretical; they are matters on which it should take the lead as the G20 evolves.  Similarly,
Canada should work with others to ensure that the emerging economies are appropriately
represented at the governance level in other global institutions, particularly the IMF and the
World Bank.
Plan for Future G20 Agenda-building 
The G20’s first order of business should remain managing the aftermath of the recent financial
crisis. The G20’s ambitious work program in this area must be brought to completion. As that
proceeds, however, Canada should plan for broadening the G20 agenda to include areas such as
climate change, energy security, and nuclear non-proliferation, where the linkages with
economic policy are clear and the shared vulnerability of states make them natural additions to
G20 discussions. 
60 Such an effort would in any event be useful in the context of exercises such as Canada’s current campaign for
membership on the UN Security Council.
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Make the G20 Work Substantively 
To help shape a process that is still feeling its way, Canada should focus on setting the research
agenda for the G20. For example, given the demonstrated ineffectiveness of command
economies, tools are needed to manage a multi-polar, networked world where subsidiarity,
freer individual decision-making, and more effective local responses to local conditions and
aspirations make the most sense. Better use by governments of the new social media may be a
useful building block in this regard. A systematic research agenda should be developed to
provide support for future G20 work.
Mobilize G20 Intellectual Resources 
A related Canadian initiative aimed at improving summit productivity would be to support the
establishment of a G20 think tank network. The network would have responsibility for keeping
track of G20 commitments and accomplishments as well as undertaking specific pieces of
research at the request of leaders. The think tank network could help to develop the policy and
research capacity of developing countries inside and outside the G20. In doing so, the network
would act as a G20 outreach function, ensuring that G20 approaches are well understood
elsewhere and providing the G20 with a window on views and concerns of non-G20 states,
especially in the global South. This grouping of think tanks would also act as a mechanism for
plugging the summit process into the growing parallel sets of international networks (inside
and outside government) that are forming the world of ideas within which global decisions are
taken.
Make the G20 Work Logistically 
On the logistical side, Canada should push for the troika approach to summit management.
This would mean that the past, current, and future sherpas would work as a team to ensure
continuity, consistent fair treatment of participants, and meaningful follow-up on commitments.
G20 summits will be productive only if the preparation/debriefing cycle is systematically
maintained. Consideration could be given to offering to situate the revolving troika secretariat
in Canada.61
Ensure the G20 Remains Open and Accountable 
One of the characteristics of the otherwise quite successful “Anglo-American financial project”
has been growing inequality both within and among nations. This inequality is a recipe for
instability and unrest. Canada should take the lead in grappling with the practical implications
of rebalancing the impacts of globalization. As part of this effort, Canada should work to
ensure that states not at the G20 table are given adequate and appropriate voice and the means
to influence that forum. Consultation with non-state actors should continue to be the
responsibility of individual G20 states, but it should be recognized that, as a purely 
61 See the recent suggestions along this line by the past and current heads of the North South Institute, Roy Culpeper
and Joe Ingram, “Make Canada the G20’s permanent home,” Globe and Mail, 7 August 2010; available online  at
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/make-canada-the-g20s-permanent-home/article1664535/.
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intergovernmental process, the G20 needs to take into account the “democratic deficit”
concerns of civil society. G20 host states might choose to make special efforts in this regard to
engage in advance with the business community and environmental or socially concerned non-
governmental organizations.62 On the accountability side, documentation along the lines of the
G8’s Muskoka Accountability Report should be encouraged.
Grasp the G8/G20 Nettle 
Canada should lead work on resolving the relationship between the G8 and the G20, with a
view to bringing the G8 summits to an end. One option for moving in this direction would be
to use a new G20 foreign ministers’ forum to take on discussion of key security issues. This
might be a natural progression after the financial crisis eases and the aftermath is re-absorbed
into the G20 finance ministers’ agenda. 
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
The shape of the world has changed. The nation-state now acts in a global environment
characterized by vastly increased interdependence, a multiplication of governmental, non-
governmental and personal networks, extreme rapidity of change, and almost total
transparency. International processes and institutions have been slow to respond to these
circumstances.
Heads of government have a critical role to play in overcoming this inertia, and the G20
provides a vehicle for them to bring their personal judgment to bear. The G20 might not be the
perfect method of addressing this challenge, but its track record so far has been reasonably
encouraging. 
The G20 deals with issues of vital national importance to Canada. For the moment, the G20
remains a work in progress, the development of which Canada still has the opportunity to
influence. The national interest demands that Canada make full use of that opportunity.
62 Canada has done this in the past, as have other summit hosts — South Korea is continuing with this approach.
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